



Fabricated frames as a way of erasing historical memory (based on the discourse of Russia's aggression against Ukraine)

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Abstract

This paper views the peculiarities of the use of language units as a means of waging the information aggression of Russia against Ukraine. It has been established that the use of some and, conversely, the displacement of other nouns from the social discourse can destroy established frame structures, impose false concepts that radically change the language picture of the recipient's world. The study is based on the concept of a "fabricated frame" as a way of misinterpreting events. Thus, for many years, Russian propaganda, using a well-established set of language units, has been trying to establish a false verbalization of traditional Ukrainian concepts. This causes the erasure of Ukrainian national and historical memory. The destructive influence is carried out through all possible channels of communication (mass media, social networks, books, movies, etc.). The following main ways of destroying the frame structure are identified: 1) replacement of key lexemes in the message (the term "борець за незалежність (fighter for independence)" is replaced by "бандит (bandit)" or "фашист (fascist)"); 2) removing lexemes from public space (for example, a ban on the use of the term "український народ (Ukrainian people)"); 3) introduction into a negative context (in particular, images of Ukrainian national heroes (including writers and scientists) with the help of words with negative, often derogatory semantics), etc. Therefore, countries that are in the potential zone of the Kremlin's interest should timely recognize the cases of language aggression in public discourse to develop an effective system of countermeasures.

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1. Introduction

The French philosopher Jean Baudrillard (1994) noted that "forgetting extermination is part of extermination because it is also the extermination of memory, of history, of the social, etc.". Anciently, great empires, conquering other countries, tried to erase from the enslaved society the main images of its national memory and impose new historical narratives. A particularly common way is

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when any negative actions of the conquerors (for example, armed aggression, genocide, etc.) are presented as something positive – *protection, salvation*. By annexing Ukrainian Crimea in 2014, Russia built its own narrative in the information space, which was radically different from the real thing: the world recognized its actions as “*annexation*” and “*occupation*”, but it called it “*protection of the Russian-speaking population*” and “*restoration of historical justice*”. For recipients who are in the occupied territories in terms of such information policy, later these narratives become familiar and perceived as reality.

A man cognizes the world and verbalizes the result of this knowledge through language. However, in the case of being under the constant influence of propaganda, the speaker takes a different, often false picture of the world. This is facilitated by such techniques as the imposition of certain words, the removal of certain lexemes from the active vocabulary of speakers, the destruction of the usual associative connections between certain concepts. For example, the aforementioned words *annexation* and *occupation* for a large part of the Crimean population do not have strong associations with the events of 2014. While for most citizens the events of this period are conceptualized in these lexemes, and now almost 55% of Ukrainians consider Russia an “aggressor who threatens the existence of Ukraine as a state from which it is necessary to defend and not maintain any relations”.

The armed aggression, which began in 2014, came as a surprise to most Ukrainians. However, not for everyone: people well acquainted with the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations foresaw such a development. Why one category was ready for such a course and the other was shocked and morally unprepared? The reasons are as follows: a) the long process of erasing Ukrainian historical memory that Russia has been conducting for centuries; b) the assimilation by Ukrainians of Russian frames as a result of the adoption and reproduction of the imposed system of language means. American historian T. Snyder (2013) says that Russia has “the dangerous fantasy” that allegedly “Ukraine is not really a different country, but rather a kind of Slavic younger brother”. Thus, for a long time, Ukraine has been suffering from the imposition of a Russian picture of the world, which in no way correlates with the facts of reality.

1.1. Literature review

According to Ch. Fillmore (1982), a *frame* denotes an abstract standard situation, and to understand a particular context, the speaker needs mental access to a set of such schematic situations. That is, to fully understand someone’s statement, a person must understand the mentality of the speaker. And belonging to different mental categories can provoke a misunderstanding of the context. Following Ch. Fillmore (1982), the authors consider the *frame* as a kind of system of concepts. To understand each concept, the recipient must be familiar with the entire system. If the recipients understand one concept, they have access to the other concepts in the frame structure. However, under the influence of propaganda, there is a destruction of the usual frame structure – a kind of fabrication of reality (Laroyo & Glover-Meni, 2019). In particular, E. Goffman (1974) distinguishes two types of frames: primary (natural and social) and transformed (or fabricated). He introduces such concepts as “*fabrication of the frame structure*”, “*frame breaks*”, “*misframing*” and others. By fabrication, he means actions aimed at “changing the situation so that other people have a false idea of what is happening”.

So, guided by the terminological apparatus of E. Hoffman, the authors will use in our study the concept of “*fabricated frame*”. It can be explained by the example of a situation when the speaker loses access to the usual structure of frames, which is gradually filled with other concepts. For example, now a resident of Central Ukraine does not have access to a full-fledged frame system of the concept *Наддніпрянина* (*Naddniprianshchyna* – “Over Dnipro Land”) because due to the long stay of the country in the USSR, the structure of this frame was destroyed. In such cases, it is impossible to

adjust a particular frame to reality. And that is why the average residents of the central territory now do not know that they are residents of *Naddniprianshchyna*. However, they have access to the frame structure of *Кіровоградська область* (*Kirovohrad region*), as this is the administrative division introduced by the communist totalitarian regime. The USSR sought to destroy any associative ties with Ukraine's historical past and the notions that preserve it. This is how one collective frame is destroyed, and replaced by another – also collective, but falsified, artificial. Thus, a *fabricated frame* is a hierarchically organized data structure filled with terminal elements that create a misrepresentation of a particular stereotypical situation or concept.

Frame semantics makes it possible to reflect, verbalize the experience of a particular ethnic group. In particular, the problem the author's study is significantly influenced by the peculiarity of Ukraine's geographical location on the border – between Europe and Asia, between West and East (Rieber, 2014; Bal-Gezegin, 2019). Because of this, some of its territories were periodically part of different empires, and the population was assimilated, adopting foreign cultural and historical narratives. The confrontation in the Ukrainian tradition of Western European and Russian vectors of development makes it important to apply the ethnocentric concept of A. Wierzbicka (1997) to clarify the peculiarities of mind and language pictures of the world. In particular, the authors consider it important to define the keywords and nuclear values of individual cultures. In modern Ukrainian culture *незалежність* (*independence*) is one of the keywords, and the concept of independence can be considered a nuclear social value. This is primarily due to the difficult geopolitical conditions which deprived the Ukrainian people of their own statehood for hundreds of years.

1.2. Research questions

The purpose of the proposed research is to investigate the methods of erasing historical memory with the help of forming fabricated frame structures by analyzing the system of lexical units imposed by Russia in the Ukrainian and Russian information spaces of different epochs. In line with this purpose, the following research questions will be addressed and discussed in the study:

- In what ways are the frame structures of the Ukrainian language destroyed and what are the consequences of this?
- What warnings does this imply for other countries?

2. Method

The theoretical and methodological basis of the proposed study is the theories of the semantics of frames by Charles J. Fillmore (1982), fabricated frames by Erving Goffman (1974), the concept of cognitive models, and the conceptual metaphor of George Lakoff. Anna Wierzbicka's (1997) ethnocentric concept and Jean Baudrillard's (1981) theory of simulacra are also involved. Since the frame is a kind of means of storing certain information in human memory, the authors consider it appropriate to use frame theory to explain the destruction (erasure) of national memory in the context of Russia's information war against Ukraine. The following methods are used in the study: structural-semantic method facilities to single out the lexemes verbalizing certain concepts; discourse analysis allows to determine the semantic structure of the studied texts in relation to extra lingual factors (political, historical, psychological, social); intent analysis helps reveal the hidden meanings of statements. S. Zhabotynska's (2011) theories of the structure of base frames are used in determining the frame structures.

Publicistic and scientific discourses of different epochs on the discovery of myths created by Russia, which destroy the historical and national memory of Ukrainians, are studied. Like other legal sciences, criminal law serves the policy of countries, supplying it with the necessary theoretical tools

and other research results of its subject from the standpoint of scientific truth. The research methodology is based on the principles of dialectical materialism as a universal method of cognition. Guided by the principles of cognitive linguistics, the authors will consider the use of linguistic units as a verbalization of the cognitive activity of people, their perception of the surrounding world. In this regard, the authors will use such concepts of cognitive linguistics as *frames* and *concepts*.

3. Results and Discussion

Cognitive science argues that human attempts to correlate the information with already known concepts are based on previous experience, through which people perceive certain life scenarios (Sternberg et al., 2012). However, artificially created, fictional images can be considered as equivalent to those that a person sees live. For example, if a person has never been at sea, he or she receives his image from someone else's experience. But when he/she is told from childhood, for example, that a sea is a place where sharks constantly attack people, injure them and kill them, then in time he/she will create only such an image of the sea. Thus, any mention of it in his/her brain will immediately activate the reflexemes “*kill*”, “*injure*”, “*attack*”. However, even if people have their own experience, their associative connections with certain lexemes can still be changed, destroying the established frame structure and building a new, radically different one. In particular, this was clearly demonstrated by the situation concerning the spread of coronavirus infection. The bombardment of the information space with the words “*infection*”, “*short of breath*”, “*die alone*”, “*overcrowded morgues*”, “*crematoria can't cope with*” caused fear in people and disturbed for some time the idea of the usual stereotypical situations. For example, the concept of “communication” began to be verbalized by the reflexemes “*danger*”, “*infection*”.

Similar processes take place during the information war that accompanies armed conflicts. The main task, in this case, is to destroy the usual picture of the world for a certain society and impose another – false, artificial. For example, during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Russia used the emotional narratives of World War II. The words “*нацизму*” and “*фашизму*” (“*nazis*” and “*fascists*”) were introduced into the information space. Such conceptual metaphorical labels automatically endow the denoted subject with negative characteristics. In the Russian media, these lexemes began to be used as synonyms for the ethnonym “the *Ukrainian*”, and the activities of the Ukrainian army were interpreted as “*punitive operations*” and “*genocide against the Russian-speaking population*”. As a result, some Russian-speaking people living in the areas affected by the propaganda believed that they were in danger of physical destruction. However, to say that this was the result of propaganda only during the active phase of the war would be wrong. Because the occupied territories are now those regions that were previously part of the Russian Empire and even during the period of independence were still subjected to systematic “Russian information zombieing” which made possible the current aggression.

Table 1. The concepts and the results of the information war between Russia and Ukraine

The concepts of Russian propaganda	
"The <i>Ukrainian</i> "	“ <i>nazis</i> ”, “ <i>fascists</i> ” “ <i>punitive operations</i> ” “ <i>genocide against the Russian-speaking population</i> ”
The result Russian of propaganda	
"The <i>Ukrainian</i> "	dangerous aggressors

By accepting someone else's vocabulary, the authors accept with it a part of someone else's picture of the world. That is why it is important for countries that are exposed to information aggression to adapt the accepted linguistic means to their own system of values. Because the main task of information warfare is to impose the aggressor on the opposing country a specially created model, which mainly has a destructive effect on society. Therefore, in the context of informational and armed confrontation, it is important to learn to recognize these signs of imposing alien meanings. For example, it is enough to replace the word "occupation" with the lexeme "freedom" – and the frame content of a certain situation will change dramatically. For example, let's compare two sentences: 1) *the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic peoples*; 2) *The Soviet Union freed the Baltic peoples from Hitler's troops*. In the first sentence, the authors have a real reflection of reality, i.e. almost 50 years of occupation of the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) by the Soviet Union. However, the USSR interpreted this as "freedom". In this way, Soviet society assimilated the wrong structure of the frame, adopted an alien, imposed scenario.

As a case in point is the attempt of the Soviet propaganda to hide the fact of the shooting Polish officers by the NKVD bodies (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR) in the *village of Khatyn* of (including ethnic Ukrainians who were serving in the Polish army at that time) is indicative. The USSR tried to convince everyone that these crimes were committed by the Nazis. To do this, propaganda mythologized the village of *Khatyn*, making it a symbol of Nazi atrocities. One of the largest memorial complexes dedicated to the Second World War was built there. But the reason for such attention to this village was only in the phonetic consonance with the toponym *Khatyn*. Therefore, when the topic of the Khatyn shootings was declassified and entered the information space, the average recipient still confused these two place names and habitually associated *Khatyn* with the barbarities of the Nazis, not the Communists. Thus, paronymic proper names have become both a means of erasing public memory and a means of substitution, which has confused even the world community (Davies, 2006; Klecel, 2010). This example is illustrative and clearly demonstrates the possibilities of linguistic means in the formation of the propagandistic myth.

Let us dwell in more detail on the explanation of linguistic manipulations, considering how Russia has been destroying for centuries the main symbols of Ukrainian statehood. For many centuries, Moscow has tried to erase the memory of all fighters for Ukraine's independence from the public consciousness. Everyone who dared to fight for Ukraine was unequivocally declared *зрадником, бандитом* (a traitor, a bandit), etc. M. Fabiszak (2007), researching the coverage of the topic of war in media discourse, notes that "that the ritual verbal abuse of the enemy is a part of the cultural construal of war". Consider the destruction of the true and the imposition of a false frame structure on the example of conceptual spaces, or concepts of Mazepa and Petliura.

Concept of Mazepa. The image of the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa (Figure 1) was significantly distorted by Russian propaganda and was misplaced for hundreds of years. For the fact that Mazepa (in order to preserve the independence of the Ukrainian state) opposed Petro I, he launched a campaign to tarnish the reputation of the hetman. In one of his letters, Petro I wrote about Mazepa:

(1)... перейшов до короля шведського по договору з ним з таким своїм злим і безбожним замислом, щоб ... церкви й монастирі святі православні обернути в Римську та уніатську віру, а самому бути самовладним князем над усією Малоросійською землею" (...passed to the King of Sweden under a treaty with him with such an evil and godless plan that... to convert holy Orthodox churches and monasteries to the Roman and Uniate faiths and to be an autocratic prince over the whole of Little Russia") (Andreev, 1948; Brekhunenko, 2017).



Figure 1. Ivan Mazepa (1639-1709)

In this quote, Mazepa's actions are diminished to the level of his own petty interests – *“стати князем (to become a prince)”*. Thus, the concept and desire for independence are eliminated. In addition, the action itself is also interpreted as a *“замисел (plan)”* and labeled with epithets with negative semantics *“злий (evil)”*, *“безбожний (godless)”*. As a result of this information warfare, fake slots such as *“переслідувач церков (church persecutor)”*, *“відступник (apostate)”*, *“єретик (heretic)”*, *“полишив православ'я (left Orthodoxy)”* and the like were built into the frame structure of concept *“Мазена (Mazepa)”*. A set of such constituents helped impose the main concept – *зради (treachery)*. The very concept of *“зрадник (traitor)”* forms the nuclear terminal of the Russian-imposed frame Mazepa. The lexemes as *“зрадник (traitor)”*, *“зрадництво (treachery)”*, *“перевертень (werewolf)”* were rooted in any text about this hetman throughout the time Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This interpretation was instilled in Ukrainian schools, and of course, still remains an integral part of Russian scientific works (for example, Sanin, 2006). Thus the formation of a simulacrum about the alleged *“unity of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples”* began. And based on this, a myth about Mazepa, who had allegedly betrayed this “unity” was created. For centuries, such language manipulation has imposed on Ukrainian society the fabricated frame structure of the Mazepa concept. Instead of the real constituents *“державник (statesman)”*, *“захисник (protector)”*, etc., the opposite structure was built with the components *“зрадник (traitor)”*, *“відступник (apostate)”*, *“безбожник (atheist)”* and so on. And the lexeme *“мазепынці”* became synonymous with the word *“зраднику (traitors)”*.

Thus, it is possible to model the following structure of the action frame: 1) who (agent/subject); 2) action; 3) with whom/what; 4) about whom/what (object); 5) purpose of the action. If we take the Ukrainian interpretation, the frame in which the agent (executor of the action) is “Mazepa” will consist of the following slots: 1) Mazepa – 2) united – 3) with Sweden – 4) against Russia – 5) to protect Ukraine. However, the imposition of the Russian narrative led to the destruction of the above frame and the construction of another structure: 1) Mazepa – 2) betrayed – 3) ally Russia – 4) with Sweden – 5) for own interests. Thus, we see that in one structure the key slots are *“unification”* and *“protection”*, and in another, fabricated – *“treachery”* and *“own interests”*. Thus, for several centuries, the true national memory of this Ukrainian hetman was replaced by a fabricated one. And the restoration of justice became possible only after the country's withdrawal from the totalitarian USSR. However, during independence, Russia has been constantly influencing part of Ukrainian society through its information resources, continuing to impose these false narratives.

Concept of Petliura. Similarly, the Soviet authorities erased from the national memory the name of Simon Petliura (Figure 2) as a fighter for Ukrainian independence. Instead, society was forced to falsely fill the frame structure of the “Petliura” conceptual space. The lexemes “бандит”, “погромщик”, “злочинець”, “вбивця (“bandit”, “thug”, “criminal”, “murderer”) are used as correlates to his name. Soviet propaganda even coined the term “petliurivtsi” as a synonym for the word “bandits”.



Figure 2. Simon Petliura (1879-1926)

There was a particularly active campaign of blaming Petliura for the massacre of the Jews. Even his murder was presented as alleged revenge of a Jew for the massacre. However, historians claim that the murder was in fact organized by the Soviet authorities in order to discredit the Ukrainian national liberation movement and the figure of S. Petliura as one of the leaders of this movement (Lytvyn, 2000). In fact, there are many documents that claim that S. Petliura tried in every way to prevent the massacres: he issued orders to ban them; punished the guilty (Mytrofanenko, 2015; 2017), and there are also known facts when Jews were paid compensation to victims of the massacres (Serhiichuk, 2006). However, it was advantageous for the Bolsheviks to denigrate Petliura’s name so that it would be associated not with the struggle for independence but with the killings of Jews. Russian historians describe the Ukrainian leader as follows:

(2) Когда Симоном Васильевичем заинтересовались русские власти, он *бежал* туда, в центр заговорщиков, – австрийско-польский город Лемберг (ныне Львов). Там его обучали, как надлежит вести подрывную работу против Российского государства, и отправили назад (When the Russian authorities became interested in Simon Vasilyevich, he *fled* there, to the center of the *conspirators*, the *Austrian-Polish* city of Lemberg (now Lvov). There he was taught how to conduct *subversive work against the Russian state*, and was *sent back*) (Semanov, 2001).

The lexeme “бежал (*fled*)” has a derogatory connotation and shows Petliura as a coward. The lexemes “австрийсько-польський (*Austrian-Polish*)” and “російський (*Russian*)” are contextual antonyms that contrast Russia with the West. In this context, S. Petliura is shown as a man who was used by “enemies” to fight against Russia. Petliura’s search for allies in support of the country’s independence was interpreted as a search for a “більше вигідного хазяїна (*more profitable master*)” (Semanov, 2001). This again demeans the very notion of the struggle for independence. So, we have two different action frame structures:

Ukrainian: 1) Petliura – 2) fight – 3) against the Bolsheviks – 4) for independent Ukraine.

Russian: 1) Petliura – 2) killed – 3) Jews – 4) because he was anti-semite.

For decades, the second structure was dominant in the public space and influenced the formation of the language picture of the world of Ukrainians. The "fighters for independence" frame was destroyed, erased from memory, and replaced by others that associated the activities of people like Petliura exclusively with banditry and anti-Semitism. Russian propaganda not only eliminated the significance of the actions of individuals but also destroyed the very notion of the struggle for independence. Consider the structure of the frames *Russian-Ukrainian War*, *Kruty*, *liberation struggle*.

Concept of Russian-Ukrainian War. Russia immediately called the armed conflict in Donbas (early 2014 and up to now) a "гражданской войной (civil war)", while Ukraine interprets it as a "російсько-українську війну (Russian-Ukrainian war)". As a result, we have different meanings of frame structures depending on the information field in which the recipient is.

Let's compare two action frames – Russian and Ukrainian:

Ukrainian: 1) RUSSIA – 2) committed aggression – 3) against Ukraine

Russian: 1) the people of Donbas – 2) rebelled – 3) against Kyiv.

The use of geographical names in these structures carries the main semantic load. The first frame through the use of country names (*Росія – Україна* (Russia–Ukraine) indicates that the conflict is between two states; this brings events to the international level and signals a violation of international law. The second one uses exclusively Ukrainian toponyms (*Київ – Донбас* (Kyiv–Donbas), naming different regions within one state, and thus narrows the scale of opposition exclusively to the internal Ukrainian conflict, which removes responsibility from Russia's aggression.

Concept of the liberation struggle. This term in Ukrainian historiography refers to the events of 1917–1921, when Ukraine fought for independence, reflecting the armed aggression of Soviet Russia. However, Soviet propaganda did everything possible to replace such names as "визвольні змагання", "боротьба за незалежність" ("liberation struggle", "struggle for independence") with the correlations "громадянська війна", "боротьба трудящих" ("civil war", "struggle of workers"). The notion of *більшовицької агресії* (Bolshevik aggression) was replaced by the correlate "допомога" *російського братнього народу* (help of the fraternal Russian people) (История Украинской ССР (Condufor, 1984).

In the structure of the frame "civil war" slot subject (performer of the action) is represented by agents "трудящі", "народ" ("workers", "people"). Thus, the structure of the false action frame is as follows: 1) the Russian people – 2) help to fight – 3) Ukrainian workers – 4) against the counter-revolution – 5) for Soviet power. Although modern historians call those events as "процесом окупації України більшовиками під вивіскою УСРР" (the process of occupation of Ukraine by the Bolsheviks under the sign of the UkSSR" (Verstiuk, 2017). That is, the real situation is reflected in a frame that has the following action form: 1) the Russian Bolsheviks – 2) committed aggression – 3) against Ukraine. The term "громадянська війна" (civil war) proposed by the Bolsheviks eliminates the notion of aggression and occupation.

Concept of Kruty. The Battle of Kruty is a story about students who defended the Kruty railway station to prevent Bolshevik troops from entering Kyiv. This story has become a symbol of resistance. Therefore, in the years since the Bolsheviks managed to occupy Ukraine, their propaganda has done everything in its power to erase the memory of this event as a heroic page. To do this, a narrative frame was created, according to which the event turned into a *tragedy*. And the Ukrainian authorities were blamed for the tragedy: the constructions "українська влада навмисне відправила дітей на смерть" (the Ukrainian authorities deliberately sent children to death) dominated the public space. The conceptual metaphor of "300 Spartans" was often used in regard to the students themselves, which reported the misconception that all participants in the battle were killed. One of the pro-Russian

publicists wrote about the burial of the dead: “Детьми” в гробах отвлекали внимание от своих лукавых лиц и вертлявых политических задниц” (By means of “Children” in coffins they distracted attention from their cunning faces and nimble political asses) (Buzina, 2016).

Thus, the following structure of the action frame is important for the preservation of historical memory: 1) Ukrainian students 2) defended 3) Kyiv 4) from the enemy.

However, as a result of the propaganda, fabricated frame structures were built:

A. 1) Ukrainian authorities 2) sent 3) unseasoned/untrained/unprepared/defenseless 4) children 5) to death.

B. 1) Ukrainian authorities by means of 2) children in coffins 3) distracted attention 4) from their actions.

If in the Ukrainian narrative the main representatives of the frames are the lexemes “студенти” – “захист”, “відсіч” (“students” – “defense”, “repulse”), then in the propaganda the words “діти” – “гробу”, “смерть” (“children” – “coffins”, “death”) dominate. In the first case, the defense of the country becomes the decision of the students themselves, and in the second – the authorities allegedly “forced” them. Thus, by replacing the key lexemes in the message, it is possible to destroy the traditional frame structure and impose a new, fabricated picture of the world on the recipients.

Explanation through negation. The traditional Russian narrative is an attempt to explain that Ukrainians do not exist as a nation. Russian researchers claim that the idea of the separateness of the Ukrainian nation was invented on the “щедрые гранты Габсбургов (generous grants of the Habsburgs)” (Kungurov, 2010), and the Ukrainian national movement was created by “австро-германскими спецслужбами (Austro-German intelligent agencies)” to fight Russia (Semanov, 2001). For example, books with provocative titles such as “Союз плуга и трезуба: как придумали Украину (The union between plough and trident: How Ukraine was invented)” are common (Buzina, 2016). The word “придумали (invented)” is used with the meaning “to fabricate that was absent, is absent” (Lopatin, 2013). Thus, Ukrainian statehood is presented by the author as something fictional, something that does not really exist. The widespread Russian thesis about “один народ (one nation)”, voiced even by Russian President V. Putin, is used to deny the existence of Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group:

(3) Что бы ни происходило, и куда бы Украина ни шла, мы все равно ...встретимся. Потому что мы - один народ... (Whatever happens, and wherever Ukraine goes, we will meet anyway. Because we are one nation...) (V. Putin, September 3, 2013).

That is, we are dealing with simulacra of “common origin of Ukrainians and Russians”, “Russian world”, “Russian civilization” and Ukraine as a part of it. The desire to oppose such an imposed thesis about “one nation” gave grounds for ex-President of Ukraine L. Kuchma (2003) to publish a book entitled “Україна – не Росія (Ukraine is not Russia)”. However, Russian propaganda responded with the book “Україна – не Європа (Ukraine is not Europe)” (Grach, 2008). An illustrative example of the negation is Russia’s information policy concerning the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. There was a great number of institutions and organizations, in the names of which the lexeme “Россия (Russia)”, “русский (Russian)” (Русское единство, Русская община Крыма, Русский блок, блок “Россия”, Народный фронт “Севастополь-Крым-Россия”, Российское народное вече Севастополя, Русский культурный центр в Симферополе, Русская община Евпатории, Российская община Керчи, “Русскоязычная Украина”, Русский дом) was obligatory. A lot of events with similar names were held (scientific meeting “Русские вторники”, “Русский язык в поликультурном мире”, “Украина и Россия – духовная и культурно-историческая общность”, festival “Великое русское слово”). The activities of these organizations had a clear goal – to impose the idea that Crimea is “not

Ukraine, but Russia”. Thus, the theses discussed above impose the following fabricated subject and qualitative frames:

- A. 1) Ukraine – 2) is invented – 3) by the Austrians
- B. 1) Ukraine – 2) is a part of – 3) “Russian World”
- C. 1) Crimea – 2) Russian.

Removing lexemes from public space. During the stay of Ukraine as a part of the Russian Empire in public space it was forbidden to use the terms “*український народ*”, “*українська мова*” (“*Ukrainian people*”, “*Ukrainian language*” (Nakonechny, 2013). Censorship forbade the use of words that indicated the identity of the Ukrainians and their history:

(4) Цензура забороняє Українцям називати себе й свій народ своїм іменем, а велить усюди вживати “*руський*”. Слів “*Україна*”, “*український*” цензура боїться... Так само вичеркує цензура слова “*козак*”, “*Січ*”, “*Запорожжє*”... (Censorship forbids the Ukrainians to call themselves and their people by their name, and orders them to use “*Russian*” everywhere. Censorship is afraid of the words “Ukraine”, “Ukrainian” ... Censorship also deletes the words “*Cossack*”, “*Sich*”, “*Zaporozhie*”) (Krevetsky, 1904).

Such removal of lexemes from the public sphere was one of the ways to erase national memory. The destruction of entire historical regions and the renaming of geographical names were used for the same purpose. Renaming processes also play an important role in the destruction of historical memory. That one, who possesses the territory, marks it with one’s own names. A striking example is the history of the Polish city of *Hdansk*, which was for a time annexed to East Prussia and as a result received the German name *Danzig*. Only after the Second World War Poland regained its territories and was able to return the Polish toponym to the map.

Similarly, the Russian Empire, and later the communist authorities of the USSR, imposed many colonial toponyms on Ukraine: *Катеринослав* (in honor of the Russian Empress Catherine II); *Єлисаветград* (in honor of Empress Elizabeth); *Сталіно* (in honor of J. Stalin); *Ульяновка* (in honor of V. Ulianov (Lenin)); *Кіровоград* (in honor of Serhii Kirov, one of the organizers of mass repressions and the initiator of the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932-33). Even though all the above-mentioned people are responsible for the deaths of millions of Ukrainians, cities in Ukraine have been named after them. The fact that these names have been preserved for 25 years of independence shows that Russia’s significant influence on Ukraine has continued. The situation changed only after the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014, which defined Ukraine’s pro-European path. The rejection of communist symbols in toponyms began.

The *Crimean Peninsula* is an example of the importance of toponyms. The Crimean Tatars, the indigenous population of Crimea, were expelled from the territory by the order of Stalin in 1944. The peninsula was massively inhabited by Russians. However, a large number of Crimean Tatar toponyms signaled that this territory was NOT historically Russian. Therefore, almost all settlements were later renamed, imposing Russian names. Thus, the memory of the Crimean Tatar people was destroyed for many years. Even when Crimea became part of Ukraine (1954), the settlements still remained with Russian names. The inhabitants of the peninsula for several decades lived in a space marked by Russia. This contributed to the fact that in 2014 Russia managed to carry out an armed annexation of the peninsula, accompanied by an aggressive information campaign, which imposed the idea of the primordial Russian Crimea. Crimea’s presence in Ukraine was represented as an unfortunate historical mistake. The following action frames were imposed:

- 1) Khrushchov – 2) gave – 3) Crimea – 4) to Ukraine.
- 1) Crimea – 2) is gifted – 3) to Ukraine.

The main slots that carry a semantic load, verbalized by the nomens “віддали”, “подарували”. (“gave”, “gifted”). Although in fact Crimea was included in Ukraine due to geographical factors, as the peninsula was “extremely neglected” and needed to be restored (Volvach, 2014). Thus, the removal from the public space of lexemes that carry information about the historical past erases the memory of this past. Instead, it makes it possible to build a different conceptual space.

Language means of depreciation. This method of manipulative influence is to level the scale of the event or phenomenon, its devaluation in the eyes of the recipient through the use of certain lexemes. For example, in 2013, the Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov tried to whitewash the reputation of the USSR regarding the Holodomor of 1932-33 in Ukraine. This politician has been repeatedly publicly accused of pro-Russian views. In the studio of one of the TV channels, he noted:

(5) ... Мы отметили память наших людей, которые погибли голодной смертью 80 лет тому назад. А вот совсем недавно мы отметили 80 лет со дня запуска крупнейшего нашего предприятия “Запорожсталь”. Это был праздник для всех нас... Это результат тех управленческих решений, которые принимало тогдашнее руководство Советского Союза (we commemorated our people who died of starvation 80 years ago. But quite recently we celebrated 80 years since the launch of our largest enterprise “Zaporozhstal”. It was a holiday for all of us ... This is the result of the managerial decisions taken by the former leadership of the Soviet Union) (M. Azarov, 24.11.2013).

The purpose of this message is to show that at the same time as the Holodomor, grandiose industrial construction was carried out. There is an associative connection between the concepts of “Голодомор і Запоріжсталь (Holodomor and Zaporizhstal)” as “bad and good”. In other words, the viewer is forced to think that along with the negative things, the Soviet government did positive things. Thus, the scale of the Holodomor tragedy is devalued and eroded. It is portrayed as an event that was bad but helped strengthen the industrial power of the USSR. In this way, an alternative embodied in the frame is imposed on society: 1) The Holodomor is 2) bad and good. Equally common is the use of lexemes, the semantics of which diminish the scale of the event reduces it to the level of a domestic phenomenon, not worthy of attention. In particular, Soviet and Russian propaganda often try to depreciate the struggle of Ukrainians for their independence, and the actions of the fighters are reduced to petty clashes. For example, the struggle for independence of Ukraine in the early twentieth century is called the “битвой за каналізацію (battle for the sewerage)”:

(6) ... Январское восстание в Киеве, вылившееся в битву между большевиками и петлюровцами за завод “Арсенал” и... городскую канализацию (January uprising in Kiev, which resulted in a battle between the Bolsheviks and Petliurists for the Arsenal plant and ... the city’s sewerage system) (Buzina, 2016).

The suppression of the Bolshevik uprising at the “Arsenal” plant was important in the struggle to defend Ukraine’s independence. However, the lexeme “канализация (sewerage)” brings the concept of struggle to the level of skirmishes for the redistribution of infrastructure resources. Depreciation of important symbols for Ukrainian statehood is a common method of Russian propaganda. This method is used in the book by O. Buzyna (2013). The first chapter of the book begins with the story of the suicide of the “отца украинской самостійності (father of Ukrainian independence)” – M. Mikhnovskiy. This immediately causes the reader a negative attitude to the very idea of the Ukrainian state, as the beginning of the story about it is based on the description of the suicide of its “отца (father)”. It is worth noting that historians question the version of suicide, assuming that Mikhnovskiy was in fact killed by the Bolsheviks (Turchenko, 2006). However, the author uses the topic of suicide as a way to humiliate:

(7) **В тот момент, когда грузный, с отросшим после революции пузом Михновский повис на яблоне, ломая шейные позвонки** (At the moment when Mikhnovsky, *overweight, with a belly that had grown after the revolution, hung on an apple tree, breaking his cervical vertebrae*) (Buzina, 2016).

This naturalistic depiction of suicide evokes fear in the reader (*ломая шейные позвонки; язык вывалился изо рта* (*breaking the cervical vertebrae; the tongue fell out of the mouth*), disgust (*грузный, с отросшим пузом* (*heavy, with an overgrown belly*). This creates a negative, unpleasant image of a historical person who was the ideologue of independent Ukraine, so this unpleasant shade is superimposed on the very idea of an independent Ukrainian state. One of the Ukrainian patrons is described in the book as follows: “*избыток доходов тратил на “українську справу”, как другие на дорогую любовницу* (*he spent the surplus of income on the “Ukrainian deed”, like others spent on the expensive mistress*)” (Buzina, 2016). In this context, Ukrainian culture, science, education is reduced to the level of a mistress, i.e. adultery. Russia often uses such a traumatic meme depicting Ukraine as a mistress, a prostitute, a lewd girl. Some historians deliberately use only enemy data to depict the period of the liberation struggle, ignoring the memories of Ukrainian soldiers. In particular, describing some battles of the UPR (Ukrainian People’s Republic) Army with the Bolsheviks, Ya. Tynchenko (2017) cites only the memories of the Bolsheviks:

(8) ... подкрались к окошку и видим: сидят за столом шесть бандитов и дуют в карты, а на столе пустые бутылки из-под самогона... когда один из бандитов вытащил из кармана пачку денег, раздался оглушительный выстрел нашей трехдюймовки. ... Тютюнкoвцы спросонья, в одном нижнем белье, заметались из стороны в сторону, не зная, куда деваться, бросая на ходу награбленное у мирных жителей добро (we crept up to the window and we see: six bandits are sitting at the table and playing cards, and there are *empty samogon (moonshine) bottles* on the table ... when one of the *bandits* pulled out a *wad of money* from his pocket, a deafening shot from our three-inch model rang out. ... The *tiutiunkivtsi*, asleep, in their *underwear*, rushed from side to side, *not knowing where to go*, throwing the *stolen property of civilians*) (Tynchenko, 2017).

In the given quote, the soldiers of the UPR Army are called “*тютюнкoвцы (tiutiunkivtsi)*”, according to the name of one of the commanders. The lexeme “*бандиты (bandits)*” is used as a synonym for them. The constructions “*бутылки из-под самогона*”, “*пачка денег*”, “*награбленное*” (“*samogon bottles*”, “*a bunch of money*”, “*stolen*”) are used to expose fighters for the Ukrainian independence as the people who drink and rob civilians. The availability of lexemes and compounds “*в одном нижнем белье*”, “*заметались*”, “*не зная, куда деваться*” (“*in underwear*”, “*rushed*”, “*not knowing where to go*”) makes a comic effect and creates the impression of UPR Army soldiers as cowards. In addition, the historian does not provide a version of events on the Ukrainian side. Therefore, the reader is left with only one – the Soviet version. This interpretation creates a false picture of the world in speakers who have long been exposed to propaganda. It generates aggression and hatred towards a certain ethnic group, and as a result, provokes hatred in society.

4. Conclusions

Thus, the complex approach to the study of journalistic and scientific discourses used in the research process makes it possible to determine the following results:

- 1) the erasure of national and historical memory becomes one of the ways of waging the information war of the aggressor country against the country-object of aggression;
- 2) the erasure of national and historical memory is caused mainly by the destruction and fabrication of frame structures;

3) the fabrication of the frame structure is due to the usage of concepts that carry untrue, false information that changes the conventional picture of the world of speakers;

4) the following main ways to destroy the frame structure are identified: replacement of key lexemes in the message; removing lexemes from public space; explanation through negation; the use of depreciation means; introduction into a negative context.

The proposed study is an important contribution to combating information aggression resistance, as it makes it possible to identify ways of language manipulation in the imposed information space, and thus helps develop a system of countermeasures needed by the country in the armed conflict. The Ukrainian state actively opposes Russian information aggression. In recent years, the country has focused a lot of efforts on developing its own cultural product (films, books, festivals, programs) in order to convey to society Ukrainian historical narratives. However, it is difficult for the state to resist the financially powerful Russian media machine and it is especially hard to convey its theses to citizens living in the temporarily occupied territories.

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Tarihsel hafızayı silmenin bir yolu olarak uydurulmuş çerçeveler (Rusya'nın Ukrayna'ya yönelik saldırganlığının söylemine dayalı olarak)

Özet

Bu makale, dil birimlerinin kullanımının özelliklerini, Rusya'nın Ukrayna'ya yönelik bilgi saldırganlığını sürdürmenin bir yolu olarak görmektedir. Bazılarının kullanımının ve tersine, diğer isimlerin sosyal söylemden çıkarılmasının yerleşik çerçeve yapılarını yok edebileceği, alıcının dünyasının dil resmini kökten değiştiren yanlış kavramlar dayatabileceği tespit edilmiştir. Çalışma, olayları yanlış yorumlamanın bir yolu olarak "fabrikasyon çerçeve" kavramına dayanmaktadır. Bu nedenle, uzun yıllardır, köklü bir dil birimleri setini

kullanan Rus propagandası, geleneksel Ukrayna kavramlarının yanlış bir şekilde dile getirilmesini sağlamaya çalışıyor. Bu, Ukrayna'nın ulusal ve tarihi hafızasının silinmesine neden olur. Yıkıcı etki, olası tüm iletişim kanalları (kitle iletişim araçları, sosyal ağlar, kitaplar, filmler vb.) aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilir. Çerçeve yapısını yok etmenin aşağıdaki ana yolları tanımlanır: 1) mesajdaki anahtar sözcüklerin değiştirilmesi ("борець за незалежність (bağımsızlık için savaşan)" terimi "бандит (haydut)" veya "фашист (faşist)" ile değiştirilir); 2) sözcük birimlerinin kamusal alandan kaldırılması (örneğin, "український народ (Ukraynalılar)" teriminin kullanımının yasaklanması); 3) olumsuz bir bağlama giriş (özellikle, olumsuz, genellikle aşağılayıcı anlamlara sahip kelimelerin yardımıyla Ukrayna ulusal kahramanlarının (yazarlar ve bilim adamları dahil) görüntüleri) vb. Bu nedenle, Kremlin'in ilgisinin potansiyel bölgesinde bulunan ülkeler Etkili bir karşı önlemler sistemi geliştirmek için kamusal söylemde dil saldırınlığı vakalarını zamanında tanımalıdır.

Anahtar sözcükler: dil saldırınlığı; Rus-Ukrayna savaşı; kavram; toponym; eşanlamlı sözcük

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